Are Health IT Designers, Testers and PurchasersTrying to Harm Patients? Part 3 of a Series

(Note: Part 1 is here, part 2 is here, part 3 is here, part 4 is here, part 5 is here, part 6 is here, part 7 is here, and part 8 is here.)

At the (deliberately) provocatively-titled piece "Are Health IT Designers, Testers and Purchasers Trying to Harm Patients? Part 1" and Part 2, I wrote that I would be presenting mockups showing the EHR deficiencies I am hearing about. These deficiencies in basic human computer interaction, biomedical information science, and presentation of information create a terrible user experience for clinicians.

The title of these posts are deliberately provocative because the stakes of the issues addressed are so high, not to mention a personal angle. My father died as a result of informational errors at a major hospital that could have been prevented with an effective EHR. They are dedicated to his memory.

These hellish user experiences are causing clinician cognitive overload, distracting and tiring them, and due to violations of fundamental good practices in information display, actually promoting error.

These violations are primarily due to lack of clinician input at design, sluggish vendor correction of reported critical deficits, programmer convenience, contractual gagging of a healthcare organization's ability to share these defects with other users and the public at large, and vendor immunity from liability on the basis of "learned intermediaries" (clinicians) between the defective IT and the patient.

As a medical informaticist who actually studied biomedical information science, user interface design for clinicians and other topics, I am beginning to feel like William Clowes, the famous surgeon of the Tudor period, who inveighed against the skills of many of the practitioners of his own time, characterizing them as:

".. no better than than runagates or vagabonds ... shameless in countenance, lewd in disposition, brutish in judgment and understanding ... tinkers, tooth-drawers, peddlers, ostlers, carters, porters, horse-gelders, horse-leeches, idiots, applesquires, broom-men, bawds, witches, conjurers, soothsayers, sow-gelders, rogues, and rat-catchers!"

That seems to capture the essence of many of the HIT ecosystem players of today. There's nothing new under the sun...

Here is another common EHR defect: the problem list presentation page.


(click to enlarge)


Note that the actual screen is much more dense with other information and smaller fonts than my sketch above, so clinicians have an even harder time than the screen presented here illustrates.

This display gives real meaning to my statement that HIT is designed by MIS (business computing) personnel not as a clinical tool but as an inventory system.

What is wrong with this display? Let me count the ways.

First and foremost, the list is alphabetical. This is very convenient for the programmer, but very inconvenient for the clinician. While just a little bit of clinical and informatics savvy would tend to mandate a problem list ranked or ordered in a priority fashion (e.g., more serious problems first), it's clear that savvy is lacking in an industry that provides a presentation of information clearly unsuited to the purpose of facilitating the practice of medicine!

Clinicians are forced to scan the list and use their own cognitive engine to zero in on the most important problems. Any human being, unfortunately, has a limited supply of "cognitive fuel" during any waking cycle, and when it runs out from overuse, fatigue sets in. Why do EHR designers use up that fuel rather than provide interfaces that are more fuel-efficient?

Second, this list was auto-populated. Problems and diagnoses were not entered manually by the clinician, but through a (perverse) "artificial intelligence" function created by personnel who probably never cared for patients. These items were "extracted" from other parts of the chart. For instance, when an order was placed for Mrs. Jones' glipizide sugar pill and a reason entered, the "diabetes" problem was auto-populated.

That seems nice, except for a wee problem. Others in other parts of the record who enter notes and orders might also indicate diabetes specified by a slightly different term variant, producing the repetitive clutter you see in the screen above. It serves the clinician poorly to see "diabetes" repetitively, and in correct and incorrect variants (type I was an accident).

This auto-population "feature" results in screen clutter and fosters loss of cognitive focus as a clinician reviews multiple patient charts with this same issue.

How can this appear in a production EHR system?
Mappings exist in any controlled terminology that permit elimination of such redundancies, which further tax the "cognitive fuel tank" of clinicians. Of course, one has to understand how to utilize these mappings and understand the need to utilize these mappings. The motto of this industry seems to be "let the physicians eat the programmer's dust."

(Also note the presence of useless information: "medication use, long term." What is the purpose of this item in the problem list, if not to simply waste a clinician's time skipping over it?)

Third: note the diagnosis of "atrial fibrillation," an irregularity of the heart rhythm that if not treated properly can result in strokes and death. This is an important piece of information for the clinician to know.

Except, however, when the patient does not have atrial fibrillation. This entry was auto-populated when a nurse ordered a blood clotting test and erroneously entered the reason for the test as "atrial fibrillation" (a common reason, just not the case here) to expedite the order's completion. Voila! Now Mrs. Jones carries this diagnosis, and the next clinician to come along might order her anticoagulated with heparin or coumadin for a history of A. fib, introducing yet more chance of an iatrogenic injury.

And I am told it takes going back to the vendor to have this erroneous entry permanently removed. Sheer idiocy! For instance, if the patient moves to a different unit, is discharged and returns to this hospital, or to an outpatient clinic or another hospital branch with this on the record, the chances of a screwup are not insignificant.

Fourth, and this is the most incredible, physicians are not supposed to manually populate diagnoses (in a future installment I will show the madness that occurs when they try), nor are they in this particular EHR given an opportunity to verify or abort the auto-population selections.

From a medical informatics (and common sense) perspective, that is simply madness. This is cross-occupational piracy. It is computer personnel and hospital executives "stealing" (overriding) physicians' judgment in identifying their patient's problems the way physicians see fit based on their hard-earned expertise.

Do the designers, "certifiers" (this system passed CCHIT certification) and corporate purchasers of such systems have any clue about what they are doing?

Microsoft seems to "get it!" (PDF) How long will it take the rest of the world?

More in Part 4.

It gets worse.

How about massive screen clutter in some screens (wait until I post the meds list!), and data sparsity and disconnectedness of medically related values in other screens? How about screens that force physicians to use the "finger on screen method" of correlating lab value to test type?

-- SS

addendum:

I am told that some of the vendors with products like this sell products to payers that help the payers deny payments on the basis of detecting diagnoses and problems that don't "match" the documentation in ways they deem appropriate. If that is true, they and their corporate customers are truly using physicians as dupes and patsies, forcing them to use ill-designed IT that both impairs their abilities to practice and facilitates payers in denying (or "floating") payments.


EMR-opoly by Al Borges MD. Click to enlarge. Perhaps says it all about the "EMR game."

Conflicts of Interest and George Washington University Medical School's Probation

In the Washington Post is this story of continuing troubles at George Washington University's medical school. The school is currently on academic probation, and despite previous protests to the contrary, its troubles are more than superficial.


When the medical school at George Washington University was put on academic probation last fall, school officials said the reasons were mostly superficial matters, such as problems with administrative paperwork and student complaints about a shortage of lounge space.

In fact, according to interviews and documents obtained by The Washington Post, the school had deficiencies that were considerably more serious.

According to a confidential evaluation document and interviews, GWU has done an inadequate job of monitoring students' time with patients and ensuring that those clinical experiences relate to classroom learning. Student debt levels are among the highest in the country, according to the seven-page letter sent by the accrediting agency in June and later obtained by The Post. Students complained of mistreatment. Problems flagged as long ago as 2001 still had not been addressed when the school was put on probation.

The George Washington University School of Medicine and Health Sciences is the only one of 129 medical schools in the United States on academic probation. In the past 15 years, only five schools, including GWU's, have been singled out for problems that the country's medical school accrediting agency concluded 'seriously compromised the quality of the medical education program.'


The article later provided more detail.


The committee cited inconsistent oversight of the clinical experiences in its letter to school officials. Not all the doctors who supervised students at another hospital had faculty appointments at GWU, so there was no guarantee they were reinforcing what students had learned in class. The committee noted pressure to see patients might affect the time doctors have for teaching and research.

Problems were allowed to linger. The accrediting committee noted in June, as it had in 2001, that the school still didn't have a system for monitoring student achievement and hadn't reviewed the curriculum to avoid gaps or redundancies.

Students complained of mistreatment at higher-than-average rates, according to the letter. Nationally, about 17 percent of students surveyed say they have experienced mistreatment, primarily belittlement and humiliation.

Accreditors noted a potential conflict at GWU because the ombudsman who handled student complaints also led the committee that evaluated students.


The Post reporter's analysis of the underlying problem at the school is striking:


Although it was not a factor in the decision to place GWU's medical school on probation, many people interviewed for this article also pointed to what they consider a potentially serious conflict of interest involving its top official. They said the conflict provided an incentive to keep the institution's focus on improving its hospital's bottom line rather than investing in medical education, research and training.

Since 1999, John F. Williams, GWU's provost and vice president for health affairs, also has received money and stock options for serving on the board of directors of Universal Health Services, which owns the university hospital.

Williams was paid nearly $680,000 in annual compensation by GWU, according to the university's 2006 tax returns, its most recent, and UHS reported in Securities and Exchange Commission filings that he received compensation from the company that calendar year of $122,000, including stock options.


Nonetheless, the position of the university's top leadership was that Dr Williams did not really have a conflict:


GWU leaders asked Williams to resign from the corporation board and this month accepted his resignation, effective by the end of the academic year. They said his position at both institutions could create the appearance of a conflict of interest.

'No information emerged to indicate an actual conflict of interest,' the university said in a statement.


So let's see... Dr Williams is on the board of directors of Universal Health Services Inc, a large for-profit hospital management company. As a director, he has a fiduciary duty to the company's stockholders to maximize its profits and its financial health. To compensate him for these responsibilities, he was most recently paid $122,000 yearly, and per the company's 2008 proxy statement, has amassed stockholdings of 10,525 shares (currently valued at $38.29 /share [per Google Finance today, 23 February, 2009], thus worth approximately $400,000.)

Universal Health Services Inc now owns and runs the GW Hospital. GWU presumably must negotiate with this teaching hospital, and hence with Universal Health Services Inc about matters that affect the medical school's educational programs. Improving those programs presumably might cost Universal Health Services more money. So the person simultaneously in charge of trying to increase services GW Hospital provides the school, which may cost the hospital and its parent company more, is also separately responsible for maximizing GW Hospital's and Universal Health Service Inc profits, presumably in part by reducing GW Hospital's costs. If that only results in the appearance of a conflict of interest, imagine what a real conflict of interest might look like. (And if the only problem was the appearance of a conflict of interest, why was Dr Williams forced to resign?)

The Post article featured the following discussion with US Senator Charles Grassley (R - Iowa), who has made a big effort to address conflicts of interest affecting academic medicine and health care in general:


'It's surprising that this relationship went on for many years,' Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee, which has scrutinized salaries at nonprofit organizations like the medical school recently, said in a statement. Officials at nonprofit agencies are responsible for ensuring that their assets are used for the public good, while company leaders must maximize profit, he said. 'It would be very hard for one person to wear both hats and fairly serve both interests.'



It now seems a long time ago when we first discussed a new species of conflict of interest affecting top leaders of academic medicine and other health care organizations. This species of conflict was simultaneous service on the board of directors of a for-profit health care corporation, which entails fiduciary responsibilities to that corporation's stock holders to maximize profits and improve the corporation's finances, and service as leader of a health care organization which might need to negotiate at supposed arm's length with that corporation. We thought that this species of conflict might be quite prevalent, and quite important in its effects on health care organizations' abilities to carry out their missions. Yet for a while discussion of such conflicts seemed only to appear on Health Care Renewal.

Now the new species of conflict are reported in the Washington Post, and deplored by Senator Grassley. Furthermore, there is now at least anecdotal evidence that such conflicts can impede an academic medical institution's academic mission. Now that this problem is achieving some recognition, it may be time to dream about a solution.

Hat tip and see further discussion in the University Diaries.

CCHIT - dissolved involuntarily in April 2008 for failure to file annual report required under laws of the state of Illinois

At posts "A very troubling post about the CCHIT" and "Is CCHIT Registered as a 501(c)3 in Illinois, And if Not, Where is it Registered, and Why Was it Involuntarily Dissolved in April 2008?", I questioned whether allegations by WSJ health blog commenter "CJ" that CCHIT was operating as an unregistered business after an involuntary dissolution (that occurred for some unknown reason on April 11, 2008) were true.

CCHIT is the Certification Commission for Healthcare Information Technology, an organization that "certifies" the computer programs doctors are being asked to use to replace paper order sheets and charts in patient care.

Today I received public documents from the Illinois Secretary of State's Dept. of Business Services that provide additional information. Click to enlarge.


(click to enlarge)

In the document above we find that on Dec. 28, 2006, Articles of Merger or Consolidation were filed with the Illinois Secretary of State, Dept. of Business Services to merge "CCHIT, NFP" (an Illinois Corp). with "Certification Commission for Healthcare Information Technology, Inc.", a Delaware Corporation.

The name of the surviving corporation was CCHIT, NFP, to be governed by the laws of Illinois and called "Certification Commission for Healthcare Information Technology" per Article II of the merger (not shown).

This implies the Delaware registrations seen at the Delaware business lookup (link) were ended. They are still shown under file #'s 3859636 (LLC, formed 09/24/2004) and 4273859 (Inc., formed 12/21/2006) but current status is not shown on that site as in Illinois, and may be purchased. Considering the above document, I don't believe that to be very useful (unless someone forgot to tell Delaware about the above merger!)

Next:


(click to enlarge)

In the document above dated April 11, 2008, we find the reason I sought in my prior posts for the "involuntary dissolution" of the Certification Commission for Healthcare Information Technology:

"Certification Commission for Healthcare Information Technology, being a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Illinois relating to Domestic Corporations, has failed to file an annual report as required by the provisions of "General Not for Profit Corporation Act" of the State of Illinois, in force January 1, A.D. 1987, and all acts amendatory thererof; AND WHEREAS, said acts provided that upon failure to file an annual report, the Secretary of State shall dissolve the corporation."

At the time I requested these documents on Tuesday Feb. 17, 2009, the day after the President's day holiday, CCHIT's status at the CyberDriveIllinois site was "dissolved." The two personnel I spoke with, one of whom took my request for the above documents, confirmed that status at that time:



(click to enlarge)


As best as I can tell from these documents, therefore, the Certification Commission for Healthcare Information Technology appears to have been operating as a nonentity (having been dissolved as a corporation) from April 11, 2008 and onward, apparently re-registering on or about Feb. 19, 2009, after the web controversy over registration began.

The CyberDriveIllinois site on that day changed to show CCHIT as "Active"
with an Annual Report Filing Date of Feb. 19, 2009.

This raises several questions:

  • Why did they fail to register? Surely they were informed of the dissolution.
  • Why did they continue operating without registration?
  • Who was doing business with them during the period of non-registration?
  • What is the status of certifications performed during that period?
  • What happened to the monies received from HIT firms seeing certification, and/or any monies received from government if any, during the period of non-registration?
  • What are the penalties for operating a business without registration "as required by the provisions of the General Not For Profit Corporation Act" of the State of Illinois?
  • Are there any IRS implications?
  • If the failure to file over ten months or so was due to carelessness, is this an organization that should be "certifying" complex information systems upon which lives depend?
  • Finally ... haven't we had enough of politicians and businesses that "forgot" to file their papers?

Being a physician and professor as well as a former Medical Review Officer in the public transit industry, I like to make sure my claims are documented, unlike some with HIT industry sponsorship who prefer speculation.

I note that in a response to my original Feb. 13 post on this issue "A very troubling post about the CCHIT" and at the WSJ health blog itself, CCHIT marketing director Sue Reber wrote:

The “facts” in the previous post are deliberate misinformation from an anonymous source ... CCHIT was founded originally as a LLC but has subsequently transitioned to a private, nonprofit 501(c)3 organization. That is its current status.

Perhaps Ms. Reber meant to write "that will be its current status once again after we make good on the required state paperwork ten months after we were involuntarily dissolved, after that fact became known through the 'deliberate misinformation' of an anonymous source."

One can never tell with those spinning the corporate spin, who seem to think they are dealing with dunces and forget the internet has begun to neuter the power of the corporate spin machine.

Of course, I expect to now receive "yes, they were dissolved, but now they filed the papers, so big deal" comments from those with industry interests. One wonders if such folks would care if their personal physician "forgot" to renew their license to practice medicine. Physicians can go to jail for practicing medicine without a license. From one state:

An individual who practices or holds himself out as practicing a health profession subject to regulation without a license or registration or under a suspended, revoked, lapsed, void, or fraudulently obtained license or registration, or outside the provisions of a limited license or registration, or who uses as his own the license or registration of another person, is guilty of a felony.

Finally, these documents cost me $15. Do I have to pay taxes on the $15, or can I file papers to declare myself a nonprofit?

-- SS

Addendum:

"CJ" has brought up the further issue of business licensing requirements by the City of Chicago in addition to state requirements. A comment was received via the blogger comments form that "the City of Chicago confirmed that the Tax & License Authority paid CCHIT a visit on Friday February 20, 2009 to inspect their business license. Effective as of today February 23, 2009 CCHIT is still operating without a valid [city] business license."

I will try to verify, and wish "CJ" would provide more information about who he or she is, exactly, but considering the above documents, I would not consider this additional claim unreasonable.

A Vendor/Doctor Dialog On Healthcare IT?

In response to my recent post to the American Medical Informatics Association's clinical information systems (CIS-WG) and organizational issues (POI-WG) workgroups about my WSJ letter to the editor, Charles Jarvis, an AVP of Healthcare Industry and Government Relations at HIT vendor Nextgen.com thoughtfully suggested I "come and listen to how the government, providers, insurers and yes- HIT providers- can work together for the common good before drawing such strong conclusions."

Dialog is a useful idea. I am always open to listening.

However, dialog must be among equals in an atmosphere of complete transparency. Otherwise it is not dialog, it is politics.

How can there be "dialog" in an environment where one side is able to squelch open discussion of the issues?

Right now, there are generally agreements in vendor contracts with HC providers specifying that information about EHR problems cannot be shared.

For example, screenshots demonstrating reasons for poor user experiences or defects (or even shots with none of those) cannot be shared with the community. I have been told this is due to such screens contractually being considered as IP and "protected" to prevent "reverse engineering" (of features and functionality familiar to undergraduate CS students, no less).

It has forced me to resort to hand drawn mockups to present issues of poor user experience, poor biomedical information science, poor information presentation, promotion of cognitive overload and error, etc. I am doing this to circumvent the effective censorship in a series I am writing here (with a deliberately provocative title to attract attention) on actual production EHR problems.

Dialog in healthcare begins with full public transparency. Will the HIT vendor community open its sharing of information about its products to allow a true dialog to occur?


Will the HIT vendor community stop (meaning, NOW) experimenting on patients, doctors, nurses, and other users without their consent?

Perhaps then we can talk as equals and demonstrate the patient wreckage from the selling of experimental devices that have not been rigorously studied for safety and efficacy, and where the data that we do have points to some quite real problems.


-- SS

Addendum: I shared this bit of irony with the AVP at NextGen:

... in late 2003 after the collapse of Merck's pipeline, I wrote to your [NextGen's - ed.] CEO and HR department in Horsham about my availability to help in their EHR efforts. This was prior to the bulk of my writings on HIT difficulties. I did not so much as even get a response or inquiry, although I live thirty minutes away.

Perhaps you could explore why your company showed no interest in perhaps the only formally trained medical informaticist in this area, and former CMIO of a major hospital in the region (Christiana Care).

One cannot have a dialog with an industry that holds your occupation in low regard.

Are Health IT Designers, Testers and Purchasers Trying to Harm Patients? Part 2 of a Series

(Note: Part 1 is here, part 2 is here, part 3 is here, part 4 is here, part 5 is here, part 6 is here, part 7 is here, and part 8 is here.)

At the (deliberately) provocatively-titled piece "Are Health IT Designers, Testers and Purchasers Trying to Harm Patients? Part 1", I wrote that I would be presenting mockups showing the EHR deficiencies I am hearing about. These deficiencies in basic human computer interaction, biomedical information science, and presentation of information create a terrible user experience for clinicians.

The title of these posts are deliberately provocative because the stakes of the issues addressed are so high, not to mention a personal angle. My father died as a result of informational errors at a major hospital that could have been prevented with an effective EHR. They are dedicated to his memory.

These hellish user experiences are causing clinician cognitive overload, distracting and tiring them, and due to violations of fundamental good practices in information display, actually promoting error.

These violations are primarily due to lack of clinician input at design, sluggish vendor correction of reported critical deficits, programmer convenience, contractual gagging of a healthcare organization's ability to share these defects with other users and the public at large, and vendor immunity from liability on the basis of "learned intermediaries" (clinicians) between the defective IT and the patient.

Imagine if aviation worked this way. Imagine if the crash of the Continental Connection Flight 3407 had been due to defective instrumentation as suggested by the pilot's union.

I cannot present actual screen shots of vendor EHR defects, since the vendor contracts forbid that on the basis of intellectual property protection. However, I am drawing mockups to substantially illustrate the problems I am hearing about.

I am starting off with a relatively simple example. Many more will follow in future parts of this series.

This one can be called "Warning, no warnings" and reflects two problems I've heard about rolled into one:


(WARNING! No warnings! Click to enlarge)


This is a fictional representation of a screen from an actual major vendor EHR in use at many large hospitals in this country today.

Note the following:

  • A warning that there are no warnings about abnormal results. "Please review all results carefully, there are no indicator flags" - in 2009?
  • A results section that says "negative" and "results final." Most busy clinicians' eyes would stop there, especially in the wee hours as this report is from.
  • An addendum to the report that the result is actually positive for MRSA, one of the most feared drug resistant pathogens today. In labs and diagnostic departments, a change from an initial impression or result happens. Unfortunately most EMR's do not support the old style method of erasure, or crossing out erroneous data with a pencil!
  • No flag on that addendum of any kind, although at the lab at the point of data entry, a flag was requested and seen by the reporting technician!

The lack of a flag to signal an abnormal result saves a vendor the inclusion and interface of 1 binary bit of information (well, to be fair, 8 bits or one byte, practically speaking) in computers and networks that even at consumer grade can now pass millions of bits/second, and the contents of an entire encyclopedia in milliseconds.

This is sheer stupidity. (It reminds me of the Y2K issue.)

It's bad enough that the clinician is forced to hunt around every result for an indication of normalcy or abnormalcy.

Even worse, there is a disparity between what is seen at the lab - a flag calling attention to an abnormal addendum - and what is seen in the clinician view.

While a fictitious screen, this is not a fictitious example. This type of incident (I say 'type', as the specifics of the patient's condition were different) occurred to a patient whose treatment was in fact delayed until someone more than 24 hours later noticed the addendum. The patient's ultimate fate was not reported to me.

Even still, the leaders at the organization using this EHR are considering adding a report about this flaw to the regular queue of vendor fixes, rather than taking immediate, definitive "FIX THIS, NOW!" action.

This is despite the common sense view that if this happens again before a fix and a patient is harmed or dies, the hospital system will be held seriously accountable for the delays, and IT personnel will likely be on the stand. (The vendor, of course, gets held harmless.)

Imagine a jury's reaction: CIO - "uh, we didn't think the problem all that serious, and didn't have the resources to fix it right away, but we did call the vendor who said they'd attend to it one day real soon."

I can also put blame on the physicians for their physicians' learned helplessness - trying to muddle through their work with such a system, rather than refusing to use them in this condition. Or simply (in the manner of an old time surgeon I once rounded with in a summer NSF program for high school students) picking up the terminals and smashing them as the potentially dangerous junk they are.

One could blame the doctors for not reading below the "negative, results final" mark, but why should that be needed? Why is it the responsibility of the extremely busy physicians and other clinicians to provide their extra labor for the convenience of IT and IT vendors? Would a jury hold the clinicians accountable, seeing this display?

Would an aircraft manufacturer get away with blaming a pilot for an accident caused by horrible user interaction design of a plane's instrument displays, say, a hard to find stall warning that lacked flags or audible alerts?

It is unbelievable to me that a system like this could be put into production in a hospital. Simply unfathomable.

If I am involved as an expert witness in such cases, I will be sure to have the plaintiff attorneys ask the IT personnel about their clinical credentials.

This system was CCHIT "certified", I am told. Of what value is "certification" if it allows this type of design issue, and others to follow in future installments, on to the market?

More screens in part 3 of this series. It gets worse.

Far worse.

(Part 1 of this series is here and
Part 3 is here).

-- SS

addendum:

Some have complained I am being "politically incorrect." At a time when our banks, major industries, investments, lifestyle and retirements have been seriously eroded by a combination of secrecy, incompetence, and criminal behavior on an unprecedented scale, I think such people need to get their priorities in order.